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HIGH-INCOME CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: HARMONIZING
THE NEED FOR LIMITS WITH THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD
LAURA RAATJES*
"[N]o child, no matter how wealthy the parents, needs to be provided
more than three ponies."I In the recent past, many domestic relations courts
have quoted this tag line when determining the child support obligations of
parents who earn high incomes.2 In fact, not only have courts followed the
"three pony rule" to avoid potentially providing a child with too much,
courts also have established awards that fall considerably short of the pre-
sumptive child support guidelines to accomplish this goal.3 In such cases,
courts may consider a variety of evidence, typically focusing on the child's
current needs. 4
When deviating from child support guidelines, a court may also con-
sider the parents' past expenditures on their children to determine how far
from guidelines the child support award should fall. 5 Hence, if a high-
income family lived frugally prior to divorce, then the child support should
be lower, whereas if a family lived lavishly, then the child support should
* Juris Doctor candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, May 2011; B.A., English, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006. I would like to thank Professor Katharine Baker for her invaluable
guidance and insight. I would also like to thank my husband, Benjamin, my mother, Monica, my stepfa-
ther, Zoran, and my sisters, Jennifer and Dana, for their constant love and support.
1. In re Marriage of Patterson, 920 P.2d 450, 455 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
2. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 108 S.W.3d 629, 633 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003); In re Marriage of
Patterson, 920 P.2d at 455; King v. King, No. 2005-CA-000978-MR, 2007 WL 2020054, at *2 (Ky.Ct.
App. July 13, 2007); Cadavid v. Nieto, No. FM-02-2182-00, 2009 WL 972842, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Apr. 13, 2009); Smith v. Smith, 67 P.3d 351, 354 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
3. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E.2d 1314, 1325-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (awarding
$3000 per month although guideline support ranged from $3,920.36 to $5,439.78 per month); Midence
v. Hampton, 147 P.3d 227, 229-30, 232 (Mont. 2006) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to award $2,990 per month child support where guideline support was $3,723 per month).
4. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E.2d at 1326 ("The trial court must consider the stan-
dard of living the child would have enjoyed absent parental' separation and dissolution."); Smith, 67
P.3d at 354 ("[A]t least some consideration should be given to the child's actual needs, which may
include consideration of the child's lifestyle.").
5. See, e.g., Strahan v. Strahan, 953 A.2d 1219, 1225-26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (The
court derived the children's needs from a list of costs the obligee had provided, noting, however, that




be higher.6 Moreover, as a result of such vast discretion in this area, a court
may award child support below guidelines even with considerable evidence
of an expensive lifestyle.7 In both scenarios, deviation below guidelines
presents a twofold problem.
First, such discretionary decisions provide inconsistent results within
and across states.8 Thus, parents who earn similar incomes, but live in dif-
ferent states or even in different regions of a state, will not necessarily pay
child support at comparable rates. This is due, in large part, to the fact that
states have widely varying thresholds for determining whether a parent is a
high-income earner. Some states permit courts to deviate from statutory
guidelines for high-income parents who earn as little as $50,000 per year,
while others do not permit courts to deviate for high-income purposes until
the parent earns $240,000 per year.9 Further, once a judge deviates from
the guidelines, states have a large range of methods by which the support
amount can be calculated. Currently, three states have no statutory provi-
sion regarding high-income child support, eleven states employ their own
special calculation, and the rest generally leave the decision to the discre-
tion of the court to varying degrees.o With such an array of approaches to
the problem, the parties to a child support dispute may be unable to accu-
rately ascertain their rights or the likely outcome of the case. Such unpre-
dictability can promote litigious child support proceedings, which may set
the framework for future contentious proceedings and relationship prob-
lems within the family unit.II
The second problem arises most frequently when the parents share
physical custody of the children. Sometimes courts determine child support
obligations of high-income parents that are not sufficient for the lower-
6. Cf Williams, 108 S.W.3d at 636 ("Given the evidence of appellant's affluence, exceptional
generosity, and extravagant lifestyle, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion in setting child
support in accordance with the presumptive amount derived from the family support chart.").
7. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E.2d at 1325-26 (deviating downward from guidelines
despite evidence that the child's previous lifestyle included "frequent opportunities for national and
international travel," "electronic gadgets," and "computer equipment").
8. See discussion infra Part I(A)(1) for a comparison of high-income cases across and within
states.
9. See Laura W. Morgan, Child Support in High-Income Cases: A State-by-State Survey, FAM. L.
CONSULTING http://www.supportguidelines.com/articles/art200302.html (last modified Mar. 19, 2003,
7:12 PM).
10. See id
11. See, e.g., David B. Doolittle & Robin Deutsch, Children and High-Conflict Divorce: Theory,
Research, and Intervention, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS, 425, 425(Robert
M. Galatzer-Levy & Louis Kraus eds.1999); Thomas J. Walsh, The Rise and Fall of An Archetype:
Revisions of the "Wisconsin Model" Child Support Guidelines, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 1013, 1025 (2006)
( "[T]he unpredictability of support orders from judge to judge ma[k]e support cases very difficult to
settle, causing greater expense in litigation and consumption of court calendar time.").
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earning parent to maintain the children in a lifestyle even minimally com-
parable to that of the high-earning parent.12 In such cases, the child must
live a dual life in order to conform to the differing socio-economic classes
of his or her parents, and may experience distress or other damaging emo-
tional responses as a result of such instability.13
The problems with high-income child support awards are not one-
sided. Under the current system, both the parents and the children lose
out-economically and socially. This Note proposes a solution that can
help to increase both the clarity and predictability of high-income child
support awards. The solution has two parts: (1) higher thresholds for de-
termining who is a high-income parent and (2) post-secondary educational
trusts for the children of high-income parents. This solution aims to help
alleviate the policy problems arising from the current system and to pre-
serve some limits on high-income parents' support obligations.
Part I of this Note traces the development of current child support
laws and briefly describes the states' three general child support models. It
also details the manifold problems that discretionary high-income child
support decisions can cause: inequitable settlement, increased litigation,
injured family structures, and inconsistent decisions. Part II outlines the
solution. The first step of the solution is to set higher thresholds for trigger-
ing a high-income analysis. The second step is for high-income parents to
contribute to post-secondary educational trusts. Finally, this Note explains
that, as a result of disparate parental resources and fixed costs concerns, the
solution should also apply to parents who share physical custody of their
children.
12. For a look at the importance of providing a child with a lifestyle comparable to both parents,
see Judith G. McMullen, Prodding the Payor and Policing the Payee: Using Child Support Trusts to
Create an Incentive for Prompt Payment of Support Obligations, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. 439, 441-42
(1998). There, McMullen explains that the "obligation to support one's children is seen not only as a
duty to provide the minimum funds necessary to ensure survival, but as an obligation to provide support
that enables the child to enjoy a lifestyle commensurate with the parents' respective lifestyles." Id. at
441. This idea that "'[tlhe responsibility of the parents, to support the child.., consistent with their
own station in life, is 'well nigh absolute"' underscores the innate force behind why a child should
"share in [the] bounty" of his or her affluent parent. Id. at 441-42(quoting Commonwealth ex. rel.
Kaplan v. Kaplan, 344 A.2d 578, 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)). At its simplest, this is the way families
work. To do otherwise would be to create artificial and possibly insurmountable barriers between
family members.
13. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Tara O'Toole Ellman, The Theory of ChildSupport, 45 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 107, 143 (2008).
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I. CURRENT GUIDELINES AND HIGH-INCOME PROBLEMS
A. Child Support Guidelines
Domestic relations issues have long been the province of state com-
mon law.14 As a result, judicial decisions in the late 1800s and early 1900s
regarding child support widely varied.' 5 Some states did not recognize
child support as a legal obligation, while others only recognized a limited
support duty.16 Many state courts, however, eventually began to award
child support on the basis that it was in the best interests of the child.17
Many states had codified child support laws by the 1930s;1s however, this
codification was a loose one-allowing judges wide discretion to determine
an appropriate award. 19 In 1935, the federal government made a perceptible
step into the realm of child support for the first time, 20 enacting the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC). 21 The AFDC appro-
priated money to any state that implemented a "plan for aid to de-
pendent children." 22 Dependent children included, among other
categories, those who had a parent that did not live with them. 23
Thus, the AFDC to some extent approximated a public version of
child support by giving states the funds to provide for some of the
neediest children-those who were "not being properly supported
because a parent was absent and not paying support."24
Over the next four decades, the federal government promulgated few
other consequential child support regulations. 25 The 1974 Social Services
Amendments, however, ushered in a new era of federal involvement with
14. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of
Children to the FiscalInterests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1029, 1036 (2007).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id at 1040.
18. Idat 1036.
19. See Pamela Foohey, Child Support and (In)ability to Pay: The Case for the Cost Shares
Model, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 35, 42 (2009).
20. See Laura W. Morgan, The Federalization of Child Support a Shift in the Ruling Paradigm:
Child Support as Outside the Contours of "Family Law," 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 195,
202 (1999) ("Prior to 1935, the establishment of child support was viewed as particularly a state con-
cern.").
21. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271§ 401, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (2006)).
22. Id§ 403(a).
23. Id.§ 406(a).
24. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 20 at 202-03.
25. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 541, 542
(1998) ("Although some federal child support enforcement efforts were made during the 1950s and
1960s, the current system began with the Social Services Amendments of 1974.").
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child support, requiring states to establish plans to enforce child support
orders and agencies to administer those plans. 26
Although the 1974 Amendments were a great advancement in child
support jurisprudence, the problem remained that the states had not yet
established guidelines for judges to use in determining child support
awards. The lack of guidelines was problematic largely because the states'
discretionary approaches to child support produced undesirable results,
such as inefficient proceedings, insufficient awards, and inconsistent deci-
sions. 27 Partly as a response to these problems, Congress passed the Child
Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 ("Amendments"), 28 which
required states to establish standards for child support awards.29 The stan-
dards were discretionary though; and the regulations stated that they "need
not be binding" on the judge or other official who applied them.30 Moreo-
ver, the minimum requisites for the forthcoming state guidelines required,
among other things, that the guidelines "be based on specific descriptive
and numeric criteria and result in a computation of the support obliga-
tion." 31
Soon thereafter, Congress passed the Family Support Act of 1988
("the Act") requiring all states to establish specific minimum guidelines for
determining child support. 32 The Act required that states make their find-
ings with a "rebuttable presumption ... that the amount of the award which
would result from the application of the guidelines is the correct amount of
child support to be awarded." 33After the federal government's mandate,
every state eventually produced child support guidelines. 34 Despite varia-
tions in the states' guideline structures, they have tended to produce similar
results35 that are far more consistent than the pre-guideline decisions.36
26. Title IV-D of the Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 452(a), 88 Stat.
2337, 2351.
27. See Foohey, supra note 19 at 42 ("[T]he traditional case-by-case method was inadequate and
problematic: analysts believed that awards often were deficient as compared to the true cost of raising
children; obligations were inconsistent, resulting in unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals;
and the adjudication of obligations was inefficient without consistent standards.").
28. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984; Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 651(1988)).
29. Id. at 1321-22.
30. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c) (1985).
31. Id.
32. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended at.42
U.S.C. § 667(a)(1988)).
33. Id. § 667(b)(2).
34. See Walsh, supra note 11, at 1029.
35. See, e.g., Jane C. Venohr & Robert G. Williams, The Implementation and Periodic Review of
State Child Support Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 7, 30 (1999) ("[C]hild support guidelines are providing
adequate and consistent award amounts overall.").
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Today, the states follow one of three general guideline formulas:37 the per-
centage-of-income model, the income-shares model, and the Melson-
Delaware model.38 Under each model, the obligor, the "person who owes a
duty of support," is required to pay a specified amount of money per month
to the obligee, the person to whom the obligor owes that duty.39
Thirty-three states employ the income-shares model. 40 This approach
simply divides the total child support award according to the income of
each parent. Thus, if the obligor earned 70% of the total household income,
he would pay 70% of the total support amount.
Alabama follows such an approach.41 The table below provides a con-
densed version of Alabama's table for determining the total amount of
child support that parents should pay based on the monthly gross income of
both parents and the number of children. 42 For illustration, if divorced par-
ents have one child, the column for the monthly payment of one child
would determine the support amount. If the father earns $1500 per month,
and the mother earns $500 per month, their combined monthly income
would put them in the first row below. Since the father earns 75% of the
income, he would pay 75% of $403 per month, or $302.25 per month. The
36. See, e.g., Joel Bankes, Preface, 43 FAM. CT. REv. 355, 356 (2005) ("Presumptive child sup-
port guidelines have largely fulfilled their purposes by .. . ensuring consistency in these orders across
comparable circumstances."); Robert G. Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Support, 21
FAM L.Q. 281, 286 (1987) (explaining that "[e]xperience of states with guidelines has shown that they
can improve the efficiency of adjudication processes for child support awards"). But see, Harry D.
Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, 24 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 10 (1990) (suggesting that "more consistent and coherent results would be achieved by setting a
national standard, with adjustments for regional variations in the cost of living. Having moved as far as
we have with .. . national support enforcement, continued federal deference to state-by-state discretion
seems misplaced").
37. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 11 at 1029 (noting that although there are variances between the
states, the three approaches are "in essence the foundation of all child support legislation in the United
States"). Even among the states that follow the same guidelines, some variation in the establishment and
the application of them still exists. Therefore, the three formulas that are described in this Note are not
an exhaustive description of the many variations that the states have adopted over the years.
38. For a detailed background of how these guidelines developed, see id. at 1029 (explaining that
there were originally two approaches-the percentage-of-income model and the "formula model"-and
describing income shares and Melson-Delaware as two types of the latter).
39. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1181 (9th ed. 2009).
40. See Venohr & Williams, supra note 35, at 11 (Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wyoming).
41. Administrative Office of Courts, Child Support Information, ALABAMA UNIFIED JUDICIAL
SYSTEM, http://www.alacourt.gov/ChildSupportnfo.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
42. Id. (follow "Rule 32, Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration (for cases filed on or after Jan.
1, 2009)" hyperlink).
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remaining amount is presumably paid by the mother in her day-to-day sup-
port of the child.
Combined Monthly Payment by Number of Children
Adjusted
Monthly
Grosshlnc eOne Two Three Four Five SixGross Income
2000.00 403 584 687 767 844 875
4000.00 685 990 1163 1299 1429 1553
6000.00 818 1171 1363 1523 1675 1821
8000.00 944 1345 1558 1741 1915 2081
10,000.00 1075 1532 1776 1983 2182 2371
Not all income shares models are created equally. Some states base
their models on net income, while others, like Alabama, base their models
on gross income.43 Also, Alabama's model decreases the percent of income
that goes towards child support as the combined income increases, while
other income-shares states use a consistent percentage regardless of income
level.
Thirteen states follow the percentage-of-income model.44 This model
requires the fewest calculations. It also provides similar child support
awards to the income-shares model. For instance, the first row in Ala-
bama's table closely follows the percentage-of-income model (i.e., support
for one child equals about 20% of the parents' income, two children equals
about 28%, and so on). The following table illustrates Illinois' percentage-
of-income child support model.45 For example, if an obligor in Illinois has
one child, and the court follows the guidelines, then the obligor would
simply pay 20% of his or her net income towards child support each month.
Number of Children Percent of Supporting Party's Net Income





43. See Venohr & Williams, supra note 35,at 11.
44. See id. at 11 (Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin).




Six or more 50%
Finally, three states, Delaware, Hawaii, and Montana, follow the Mel-
son-Delaware model. 46 Of the three models, it is the most complicated to
compute because it requires three separate calculations. Starting with each
parent's income, the court subtracts a "self-support reserve," which is
based on the amount of money needed for a person to subsist.47 Next, the
court determines the "children's primary support needs" amount, which,
like the self-support reserve, is based on the amount of money needed for a
child to subsist.48 Finally, the court adds to the primary support amount the
"standard of living allowance," which is an additional percentage based on
the number of children provided for.49
B. Problems with Discretionary High-Income Child Support Standards
The federal government required states to enact presumptive child
support guidelines in part to increase the consistency of the awards. The
idea was that the "greater consistency and greater predictability..., in
turn, would reduce litigable issues and encourage settlement as well as
create the perception of 'fairness' in the judicial system."50 For the most
part, this has been the result. Guideline child support formulas improve the
efficiency of the courts, the adequacy of the awards, and the consistency of
the outcomes.51
Consistent, clear rules are particularly important in divorce cases be-
cause a vast majority of cases settle, and never go to trial. 52Where clear
presumptive guidelines are in place, the parties may be better able to reach
reasonable agreements on child support.53 Thus, the parties have little rea-
46. See Venohr & Williams, supra note 35, at 11 (Delaware, Hawaii, and Montana).
47. See, e.g., Robert G. Williams, Implementation of the Child Support Provisions of the Family
Support Act: Child Support Guidelines, Updating of Awards, and Routine Income Withholding, in-
CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL BEING, 93, 97-98 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994).
48. See id. at 98.
49. See id.
50. Linda Henry Elrod, The Federalization of Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 103, 115 (1990) (footnote omitted).
51. See discussion supra pages 5-7 for a description of the approaches. See also Bankes, supra
note 36 at 356.
52. See T.K. Logan, Robert Walker, Leah S. Horvath, & Carl Leukefeld, Divorce, Custody, and
Spousal Violence: A Random Sample of Circuit Court Docket Records, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 269, 269
(2003) ("Contrary to popular belief, findings from this study indicate that divorce actions were almost
always settled through agreement of the divorcing parties rather than by adjudication").
53. See Bankes, supra note 36, at 356.
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son to argue for an award that deviates from the guidelines. Yet, as the
following discussion illustrates, the guidelines' benefits may be lost in
high-income cases.
1. Undermining Fair Settlement
Not all divorce cases actually go to trial.54 In fact, a large majority of
them settle out of court.55 Therefore, courts and commentators alike have
posited that divorce laws should be written as clear rules so that parties can
use the rules as a backdrop to determine with some degree of certainty what
they are entitled to. 56 Nonetheless, much of divorce law involves murky,
discretionary legal standards. These standards present a number of road-
blocks for parties that wish to settle their cases.
First, when such standards are the rule, it is almost impossible to pre-
dict what the likely outcome would be if the case went to trial. Where the
parties and even their lawyers have such great uncertainty, no one knows
whether they have gotten a good deal, or whether they have made a deci-
sion that reflects each party's full rights and responsibilities. The parties are
therefore unable to effectively bargain with one another.57
Second, the difficulties with these standards are so great that many
cases still have a number of issues adjudicated by a judge prior to the ulti-
mate settlement.58 For instance, "litigated disputes typically settle late, andi
often after judges have [ruled on a variety of matters]." 59 This approach to
reaching agreements in divorce cases carries with it many of the negative
factors associated with taking divorce matters all the way to trial: great
expense and time for both parties, and significant emotional stress on the
54. See Marsha Garrison, Reforming Divorce: What's Needed and What's Not, 27 PACE L. REV.
921, 929-30 (2007) ("Researchers have found that the majority of divorcing couples resolve the terms
of their divorce themselves with little conflict."); see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting
to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319,
320 (1991) ("Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know that trial is
not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one.").
55. See Logan, Walker, Horvath, & Leukefeld, supra note 52, at 269.
56. See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz, 27 P.3d 289, 295 (Cal. 2001) (noting that most parents are
capable of reaching appropriate settlements, and that "[r]equiring a [searching] judicial inquiry ... in
order to attain finality would burden courts and parties with unnecessary expense and delay"); Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W.Va. 1981); Robert J. Levy, Ellman's "Why Making Family Law is
Hard": Additional Reflections, 35 ARIz. ST. L.J. 723, 739 (2003) ("Needless to say, we cannot do
without binding rules and the search for fair rules-rules that will by and large be followed-because
they constrain otherwise objectionable judicial discretion and because they guide private negotia-
tions.").
57. Cf Gross & Syverud, supra note 54, at 323 ("The parties do not know in advance how the
court will evaluate the evidence. Therefore, they must guess the answer to the critical question: On
which side of the line will this case fall?").
58. See Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 447-48 (2007).
59. Id. at 447-48 (footnote omitted).
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family members. Moreover, because the parties "often settle in the shadow
of legal rulings," the final bargains are likely to "reflect the potentially
distorted judgment of a judge," rather than the best interests of the parties
and their children. 60
Third, divorce settlements already present an intrinsic and unavoidable
problem-unequal bargaining between the parties. For instance, the cus-
todial parent, the obligee, is typically the mother.61 She is also typically the
parent with less earning capacity, in many cases having no income at all. 62
Therefore, it is possible she will settle for lower child support payments to
avoid protracted, expensive litigation that she cannot afford.
Moreover, as is often the case, custody and child support agreements
go hand-in-hand. Thus, the concern arises as well that the obligee will
agree to lower child support payments in order to remain the custodial par-
ent.63 Where the standards are unclear, the obligee's unequal bargaining
position is heightened. Whether the obligee is well-versed in family law or
not, she is likely unable to accurately predict what she would be entitled to
in court and she is therefore unable to know whether she has agreed to a
fair settlement.64
60. See id. at 448.
61. Monica J. Allen, Child-State Jurisdiction: A Due-Process Invitation to Reconsider Some Basic
Family Law Assumptions, 26 FAM. L.Q. 293, 293 n.2 (1992) ("In 90 percent of all divorces involving
children the mother retains custody. As a result, in the overwhelming majority of cases the parent
seeking to impose, modify, or enforce a support obligation is the mother." (citation omitted)).
62. Marion Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?" Marriage and Breadwinning in Postin-
dustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1881-82 (1999) ("In 1992, 39% of all divorced women with
children lived below the poverty level. Since children of divorce are typically in their mothers' custody,
they live at the standard of living of their mothers-which means that many experience poverty. The
major problem of divorce for women, particularly custodial mothers, 'is not the lack of a male presence,
but a lack of a male income."' (footnotes omitted)).
63. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360-61 (W.Va. 1981) ("Since the parent who is not
the primary caretaker is usually in the superior financial position, the subsequent welfare of the child
depends to a substantial degree upon the level of support payments which are awarded in the course of a
divorce. Our experience instructs us that uncertainty about the outcome of custody disputes leads to the
irresistible temptation to trade the custody of the child in return for lower alimony and child support
payments. Since trial court judges generally approve consensual agreements on child support, underly-
ing economic data which bear upon the equity of settlements are seldom investigated at the time an
order is entered. While Code, 48-2-15 [19801 speaks in terms of "the best interest of the children" in
every case, the one enormously important function of legal rules is to inspire rational and equitable
settlements in cases which never reach adversary status in court.").
64. See Garrison, supra note 54 at 932-33 ("If the outcome of litigation is highly uncertain, not
even experts can offer clear advice about what constitutes a good or bad negotiated settlement. Nor does
a litigant have any capacity to judge whether his or her attorney has negotiated a good deal or a bad one.
Indeed, the attorney herself may not know whether she has negotiated a good or bad deal; her capacity
to judge success will of necessity be confined to what she learns from reported cases, her own practice
experience, and her observations.").
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2. Increasing Litigation
The state of current high-income child support law may cause parties
who are on the cusp of deciding whether to settle or to go to trial to opt for
the latter option. As it stands, parties would have much difficulty in deter-
mining whether the decision would follow guidelines, or fall above or be-
low guidelines (and by how much as well). One commentator has described
this conundrum as follows:
[W]hen legal rules are highly discretionary and imprecise, they cast a
blurred shadow that impairs each spouse's ability to determine his or her
legal entitlements and reach a mutual understanding about those entitle-
ments. Instead of consensus on case outcome, each litigant may reach
very different expectations, thus exacerbating the difficulty of forging a
negotiated settlement.65
Thus, at such an impasse, negotiations are stalled and the likelihood of
the case going to trial is greatly increased.66 This is particularly the case in
high-income divorce proceedings because at least one of the parties has the
financial resources to sustain drawn-out court battles. 67 Therefore, high-
income cases have a further increased likelihood of going to trial. 68
Moreover, the parties have an incentive to continue to fight so long as
there is reason to believe they may prevail.69 Under the current discretio-
nary determination of high-income child support, the parties can attack one
another in order to change the level of support provided. Such drawn-out
battles are likely to have negative consequences on the parents and the
children alike. Therefore, any workable solution should support the non-
adversarial resolution of disputes.
3. Harming the Family
Divorce can be emotionally harmful to all of the family members in-
volved. Some research has shown that there may be a number of long-term
and short-term negative effects of divorce on children. 70 In particular
65. Id. at 925.
66. See id
67. See Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 531, 542 (1994) ("High income groups use lawyers with greater frequency than lower income
groups: 49% of adults in the top quintile of the income scale had consulted lawyers in the three years
prior to 1989, but only 27% of adults in the lowest ten percent used legal services during the same
period.").
68. See Garrison, supra note 54 at 923 (noting that the contested divorce cases came from "the
wealthiest segment of the total divorce pool" from New York).
69. See id. at 925.
70. See, e.g., Doolittle & Deutsch, supra note 11 at 425. But see Michael E. Lamb, Child Devel-
opment and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 559, 570
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though, divorced families that are already experiencing tumultuous changes
in their lives can ill afford to be faced with unpredictable outcomes in the
courtroom. 71 In fact, "families who litigate divorce and who utilize the
court system chronically," can cause the children involved to "align[] with
one parent against the other and ... risk ... sacrificing a relationship with
one parent to stabilize and secure the relationship with the other parent."72
Child support disputes require that the divorce be litigated. Although
some children of divorcing parents are young enough to remain oblivious
to their parents' in-court disputes, older children are likely more aware. 73
Moreover, even if divorcing parents can avoid discussing the contentious
issues with their children, children are still likely to be greatly harmed by
the divorce itself.74 As a result, any decision-making routes that may re-
duce the contentious nature of the divorce process could be helpful to alle-
viate these problems.
Child support issues that go to trial can also potentially lead to
strained relationships between the obligor and the rest of the family mem-
bers. The very nature of divorce proceedings pits the former spouses
against one another, requiring them to point out each other's failings.75
Furthermore, the parties' displeasure with the outcome of the case is almost
guaranteed, since a court rarely rules completely in favor of one side. For
instance, if the obligor must pay more than he believed he should, then he
may feel cheated by the legal system and his ex-spouse. 76 Likewise, the
obligee may feel disenfranchised by the outcome as well, perhaps believing
that the child was entitled to more support than the court order provided.
(Richard M. Lemer et al. eds., John Wiley & Sons 2003) ("[C]ustody and access disputes involve
conflict, but .. . such conflict in and of itself is not necessarily harmful").
71. See, e.g., David A. Hardy, Nevada Alimony: An Important Policy in Need of a Coherent
Policy Purpose, 9 NEV. L.J. 325, 325 (2009) ("Litigants often respond negatively when their relation-
ships and resources are at risk").
72. Doolittle & Deutsch, supra note 11 at 428.
73. See Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and Conflict After
Divorce, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 441, 454 (2008) ("Ideally, children should never be exposed to their
parents' conflict. Unfortunately, many children routinely overhear their parents arguing over child
support and parenting time schedules."(footnote omitted)).
74. See James R. Dudley, Increasing Our Understanding of Divorced Fathers Who Have Infre-
quent Contact with Their Children, 40 FAM. REL. 279, 279 (1991) ("The negative effects of divorce on
all family members have been extensively documented. Children are usually hurt the most." (citations
omitted)).
75. See Hardy, supra note 71 at 325 ("The adversarial process requires parties to emphasize their
virtues and their respective spouses' flaws. The divorce proceeding is both expensive and destructive.").
76. Cf Judith A. Seltzer, Sara S. McLanahan, & Thomas L. Hanson, Will Child Support Enforce-
ment Increase Father-Child Contact and Parental Conflict After Separation?, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE:
THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 157, 157 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., Russell Sage
Foundation 1998) (Increases in child support enforcement and the amount paid may "increas[e] nonre-
sident father's dissatisfaction with the system.").
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4. Generating Inconsistent Decisions
The problems described above can result from the inconsistent out-
comes in high-income child support cases. When the obligor's income is at
one of the polar ends of the income spectrum, courts inevitably conduct a
problematic balancing of interests to determine the child support award. 77
When an obligor earns too little, the available money may not be sufficient
to provide for the subsistence of both the obligor and the children.78 In
contrast, when an obligor earns too much, whatever amount that may be,
the guideline award may be perceived as providing the child and the obli-
gee with an excessive amount of money.
Even though the high-income quandary does not pose the weighty
concerns that are present in low-income cases (in particular, whether the
child and the parent will have enough to ensure survival), it is not necessar-
ily an easier problem to solve.79The problem is so complex, in fact, that
there is little uniformity among the states on this issue.
In high-income cases, courts contend with competing concerns: pro-
viding the child with a lifestyle that reflects his or her pre-divorce lifestyle
versus avoiding potentially requiring the obligor to subsidize the excesses
of the obligee.80 Ideally, the deviation would place a limit on the support
amount at the point where the award becomes excessive and is therefore
unjust or inappropriate.81 The cases compared below, however, illustrate
77. See e.g., In re Marriage of Kern, 615 N.E.2d 402, 405 (111. App. Ct.1993) ("The guideline
amounts have some inadequacies at both ends: just as following the guidelines may produce an exces-
sive amount of support where the noncustodian is a high-income earner, following the guidelines may
produce an insufficient amount of support where the noncustodian is a low-income earner" (citations
omitted)).
The problems associated with determining child support in such cases have been a source of great
debate and discussion. See Kathleen A. Hogan, Child Support in High Income Cases, 17 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 349, 349-50 (2001); Laura W. Morgan, Child Support and the Anomalous Cases
of the High-Income and Low-Income Parent: The Need to Reconsider What Constitutes "Support" in
the American and Canadian Child Support Guideline Models, 13 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 161, 162-63
(1996).
78. While courts must establish support for the children of impoverished parents, the monthly
award can be as low as $20 per month, and could potentially be even lower in states that permit the
judge to use discretion in determining the amount. See Morgan supra note 77 at 204.
79. See Gregory M. Bartlett, Setting Child Support for the Low Income and High-Income Families
in Kentucky, 25 N.KY. L. REv. 281, 299 (1998) ("[D]etermining what is a fair and reasonable amount
for the support of a child of high income parents requires a different, but not always easier, analysis for
the trial judge.").
80. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E.2d 1314, 1326 (1ll. App. Ct. 1993) ("In fixing the
child support obligation of a high-income parent, the trial court must balance competing concerns. On
one hand, [it] should not limit the amount of child support to the child's 'shown needs,' because a child
is not expected to live at a minimal level of comfort while the noncustodial parent is living a life of
luxury..... On the other hand, child support payments are not intended to be windfalls, but rather
adequate support payments for the upbringing of the children.").
81. See, e.g., id
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the injustice that continues to pervade high-income child support cases
despite courts' often careful balancing attempts. The awards in such cases,
even in states following the same or similar guidelines, continue to be un-
predictable and inconsistent.
The first set of cases for comparison come from Minnesota, Florida,
and Maryland. At the time of the example case, Minnesota followed the
percentage-of-income model; 82 In contrast, Florida and Maryland are states
that follow the income-shares model. 83 All of these states have statutory
provisions permitting deviation where a court may consider an award from
a high-income earner unjust, excessive, or inappropriate. 84
In Joneja v. Joneja, a Minnesota case, the father's yearly income was
$345,000,85 and the court required him to pay approximately 8% of his
income to support two children. In contrast, in the Maryland case of Voi-
shan v. Palma, the father's yearly income was less than half, at $145,000,
and the court required him to pay almost 13% of his income to support two
children.86 Finally, in Miller v. Miller, a Florida case, the father's yearly
income was $121,500, and the court required him to pay about 11% of his
income to support one child.87 The father's income in Joneja was more
than twice that of the fathers in Voishan or Miller. However, both of the
latter fathers paid a significantly higher percentage of their income in child
support than the father in Joneja.
Inconsistent outcomes for high-income child support are not only no-
ticeable in states with differing calculation models. The next set of cases
comes from Illinois, a state that follows the percentage-of-income model.88
Illinois does not have a statutory provision regarding high-income child
support.89
In In re Marriage of Lee, the father earned between $235,222 and
$326,387 per year, and the court required him to pay up to 15% of his esti-
82. Compare MINN. STAT. § 518A.35(2) (2008) with Venohr & Williams, supra note 35 at 11.
8 3. Id.
84. See Morgan, supra note 9.
85. 422 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (Crippen, J., dissenting). The obligee had no
income. Id. There, the court affirmed the trial court's child support award of $1,200 per month and
$1,200 of private school expenses for two children. Id. at 309-10 (majority opinion). Also, although
this case is from the same year that the child support guidelines were officially mandated by the federal
government, Minnesota already had guideline formulas in place at this point. See id. at 309.
86. 609 A.2d 319, 322 (Md. 1992). The obligee's yearly income was $30,000. Id There, the court
affirmed the trial court's child support award of$1,550 per month for two children. Id at 322, 327.
87. 662 So.2d 391, 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The obligee had a negligible amount of income.
Id. at 391. There, the court affirmed the trial court's child support award of $1,122 per month for one
child. Id. at 392.
88. See discussion supra Part I(A)(1) for a description of Illinois' percentage-of-income model.
89. See Morgan, supra note 9.
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mated salary to support one child.90 On the other hand, in In re Marriage of
Scafuri, the father earned approximately $450,000 per year, and the court
required him to pay 16% of his salary to support three children. 91 Even the
high end of the Lee father's income range fell well below the Scafuri fa-
ther's income. The courts' descriptions of the children's lifestyles were
substantially similar in both cases. Both families went on vacations, and
both spent money on extras for the children: electronic equipment in Lee,
and lessons and camp in Scafuri. Moreover, the father in Scafuri had three
children while the father in Lee only had one. Under Illinois' guideline
table, a parent of three children should pay 32% of his income, and a parent
of one child should pay 20% of his income. 92 Yet, the two obligors were
required to pay almost the same percentages of their salaries in support of
their children-both of which were significantly lower than the guideline
amount for only one child.
The last set of high-income cases come from Hawaii and Delaware,
states that follow the Melson-Delaware guidelines. 93 Delaware has no sta-
tutory provision for high-income support, and Hawaii statutorily permits
downward deviations where the court finds the obligor's income would
create an unnecessarily high child support award.94 Thus, while both states
permit their courts to deviate from guidelines in high-income cases, neither
has a high-income provision that would otherwise bear upon the outcomes
in their cases.
In the Hawaii case of Kim v. Camerlingo, the father's yearly income
ranged from $48,000 to $156,000 per year, and the court required him to
pay between 8% and 39% of his income in support of only one child.95 By
contrast, in the Delaware case of S.S. v. CS., the father's yearly income
90. 615 N.E.2d 1314, 1325-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). The obligee's yearly income was $19,000. Id.
at 1318. There, the court affirmed the trial court's monthly child support award of $3,000 for one child.
Id. at 1326. The court considered the lifestyle that the child was used to, which included, among other
things, international travel and personal electronic equipment (a fax machine and computer). Id.
91. 561 N.E.2d 402, 408, 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). The obligee had no income. Id. at 408. There,
the court deviated downward from the guidelines, and awarded $6,000 per month for the three children,
reasoning that any more would have simply been financing the obligee's lifestyle. Id.at 406-07. The
court also considered evidence that the children "enjoy[ed] a very comfortable lifestyle" including
"restaurants, clothes, sports, lessons, vacations, camp and entertainment." Id. at 406. Additionally, in
deviating below guidelines, the court based its decision, in part, on the now-dubious economic theory,
see Ira Mark Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child Support Guide-
lines, 2004 U CI. LEGAL F. 167, 181-82, that as income increases, the percent of income spent on
child-rearing expenses decreases. Scafuri, 561 N.E.2d at 407.
92. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/505(a)(1) (2009).
93. See Venohr & Williams, supra note 35, at 11.
94. See Morgan, supra note 9.
95. No. 25036, 2004 WL 2810007, at *1 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004). The court did not state the
obligee's income; there, the court affirmed the trial court's support award of $1,570 per month for one
child. Id.
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was $519,085, and the court required him to pay only 8% of his income to
support two children. 96 The Kim father's yearly income ranged from 9% to
30% of the S.S. father's income. However, the Kim court required the obli-
gor to pay a potentially larger portion of his income in support for one less
child.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Solution Part I.: Increase the Current Thresholds for High-Income Child
Support
To help establish some consistency in high-income child support juri-
sprudence, the first proposed step is to set the thresholds for deviation
much higher. Currently the thresholds that trigger high-income deviations
are too low. They also vary widely across the states.97 By increasing the
threshold level to determine who is a high-income earner, courts can ensure
that current guidelines will be followed in a much larger proportion of cas-
es. Thus, many of the inconsistency and unpredictability problems can be
solved through a simple increase of the threshold.
1. Current Thresholds
As mentioned above, the current threshold yearly gross income for an
obligor that triggers a high-income calculation varies significantly-from
$50,000 in Mississippi to $240,000 in Arizona.98 It is undoubtedly appro-
priate for states to devise salary thresholds according to economic data
within their relevant communities.99 Indeed, this is necessary because the
average income of individuals and families varies from state to state. 100
Nonetheless, setting the high-income threshold within the current disparate
ranges appears to be inappropriate in light of current economic data.
96. No. CN01-06678, 2003 WL 23269478, at *10 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 22, 2003). The obligee's
yearly income was less than $10,000. Id. There, the court determined that an appropriate award was
$3,463.50 per month for the support of two children, reasoning that any more would have exceeded the
reasonable needs of the children. Id.
97. See Morgan, supra note 9.
98. See id.
99. Cf Molly E. Christy, Note, Unjust and Inequitable: An Argument Against Strict Application of
the Child Support Guidelines When the Obligor Parent and Child Live in Different Countries, 20
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 260, 269 (2007) (arguing that the guidelines should not be adhered to in deter-
mining child support when the child lives in a country where the cost of living is substantially less than
that in the U.S.).
100. See JESSICA SEMEGA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEN'S AND WOMEN'S EARNINGS BY STATE:
2008 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 4 (2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/acsbro8-3.pdf
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The 2008 median income for men in the United States ranged between
$36,839 in Arkansas to $58,838 in Connecticut, for an overall median sala-
ry of $45,556.101 Logically, to trigger a high-income calculation that de-
viates below guideline support, the father should earn a yearly income that
substantially exceeds the median.
In fact, the high-income analysis may best be triggered by a yearly in-
come even above Arizona's $240,000 per year for two reasons. First, there
is some concern that the levels of current child support guidelines already
inadequately provide for the many costs of raising a child.102 Thus, there is
certainly an argument that guideline levels should be higher than they cur-
rently are, 103and that, at the very least, courts should be reluctant to deviate
downward from guidelines. Therefore, the presumptive adherence to guide-
lines should apply to as many of the cases as possible to ensure at least
minimally adequate support.
Second, current estimates on the amount of money high-income par-
ents spend on their children may be based on faulty precepts.104 In fact, one
researcher has found that the econometric research upon which state child
support guidelines are based "systematically undercount[s] actual consumer
expenditures in higher income families-the higher the household income,
the higher the proportion of the household's expenditures that will be erro-
neously omitted from the expenditure tabulation." 0 5 Thus, when courts
deviate downward from the presumptive guidelines for high-income obli-
gors, they further aggravate the problem of providing high-income child
support awards that are too low.106 Therefore, casting a wider net for fami-
lies that will presumptively receive guideline support can help to ensure
that more children will receive at least a minimum base level of support.
10 1. See id
102. See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and Beha-
vioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 129 (2008) (suggesting that current
child support awards do not sufficiently cover the obligations of divorced custodial mothers who must
care for their children and work).
103. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Econom-
ics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 989, 1068-69 (1995) ( "[Rjecent studies have concluded that, even
with .. . guidelines, child support awards are too low."); Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discre-
tionary Justice in Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 209, 241 (1991)
("[S]ome models embody underlying economic data which results in [child support] awards that are too
low.").
104. See Ellman, supra note 91 at 181-82.





According to the 2009 U.S. Census, the mean income for the top 5%
of families was $295,388 per year.l0 7 In light of the current inadequacy of
child support awards in general, and the underreporting of money spent on
children by higher income families, this figure may be an appropriate start-
ing point for states' high-income thresholds. However, because local econ-
omies differ, state agencies can set an individualized high-income level that
comports with the top 5% of family incomes within their states.
To further individualize the thresholds, courts should be permitted to
use discretion depending on which region of the state the family lives in.
For instance, the average cost-of-living index varies greatly between cities
in the United States. The cost-of-living index can show just how important
it is for states to personalize their thresholds. The U.S. Census determines
the cost-of-living index for "participating areas," with the "nationwide
average equal[ing] 100 and each index . .. read[ing] as a percent of the
national average."108 Moreover, this index is based upon a number of dif-
ferent components, such as the cost of food, housing, utilities, transporta-
tion, and healthcare. 109
Thus, if a family is from White Plains, New York, where the cost of
living index is 177.6, the threshold that triggers a high-income deviation
should certainly be higher than for a family from Elmira, New York, where
the cost of living index is only 77.2.110 Ideally, the states would set forth
threshold income levels for all of the varying areas within the state. How-
ever, setting the minimum threshold for high-income deviation to the
state's mean family income for the top 5% may be sufficient as long as
107. Table H-3. Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent, All Races:
1967 to 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 16, 2010),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/H03AR2009.xls (last visited Nov.
17, 2010).
I chose family income, rather than household income for the basis of the threshold. The U.S. Census
defines "family" for income purposes as "a group of two people or more .. .related by birth, marriage,
or adoption and residing together," whereas, "household" is defined as "all the people who occupy a
housing unit. A house, an apartment or other group of rooms, or a single room, is regarded as a housing
unit when it is occupied ... as separate living quarters." Current Population Survey (CPS) - Definitions
and Explanations, U.S. CENSUS Bureau, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html (last
modified May 10, 2010). Because a household includes people who happen to live in the same "unit,"
but do not necessarily share their income or expenses or even know each other, "family" income is
likely a better framework to deal with in the child support context.
108. Cost of Living Index-Selected Metropolitan Areas: Fourth Quarter 2005, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAu, , http://www.census.gov/compendialstatab/2007/tables/07s0709.xls (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
109. See Bert Sperling & Peter Sander, CITIES RANKED & RATED: MORE THAN 400
METROPOLITAN AREAS EVALUATED IN THE U.S. & CANADA 68 (Marc Nadeau & Michael Kelly eds.,
2d ed. 2007).
110. See id. at 74.
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courts are aware of the communities in which following the guidelines may
be inappropriate.
For predictability and ease of administration, the higher threshold
amount can be set in the statute and indexed to the rate of inflation so that
there need not be legislative action every time there is an inflation change.
Some states already follow a similar approach with their child support de-
terminations. For instance, Minnesota's child support statute "requires the
Supreme Court to change the dollar amount of the income limit for applica-
tion of the child support guidelines on July I of each even numbered year,
to reflect changes in the cost of living index."InI
Increasing the threshold point to trigger high-income child support
calculations ensures that courts must follow the guidelines in a greater ma-
jority of the cases. As a result, child support proceedings can be more pre-
dictable, and therefore, less litigious and emotionally damaging. Finally,
the higher threshold will also ensure that the trust requirement explained
below will be imposed only where the obligor has an income that is so high
that (1) he or she would not experience economic hardship as a result of it,
and (2) an intergenerational transfer of wealth would have been more likely
to happen if the parents had not gotten divorced.11 2 Therefore, an increased
threshold should not harm the obligor, and should help to reflect the life-
style the child would have had if the parents had not divorced.
B. Solution Part II: Postsecondary Education Trust
Courts have used trusts in the child support context for a variety of
purposes: to safeguard against variable income,11 3 to ensure that child sup-
port payments are made from a personal injury settlement,"l 4 to create a
111. Amended Order: Cost of Living Adjustment to Child Support Guidelines, C9-85-1134 (Minn.




112. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Saul D. Hoffman & Laura Shrestha, The Effect of Divorce on
Intergenerational Transfers: New Evidence, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 319, 325-26 (1995).
113. See Thomas C. Quinlen, Planning for the Future: Using Child Support Trusts to Prepare Both
Father and Child for Life After Professional Sports, 2 VANDERBILT J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 108, 120-21
(2000).
114. See e.g., In re State ex rel.Taylor, 904 A.2d 619, 621 (N.H. 2006).
For a detailed explanation for how trusts can be used to ensure payment of child support and the reasons
for which they have been used in the child support context, see McMullen, supra note 12 at 454-55
(citing a number of bases for courts to require trusts in the context of child support, including safe-
guarding against an obligor's unpredictable income, providing postsecondary education funds for
children of high-income parents, protecting the child from a parent's irresponsibility with money, and
honoring parents' voluntary agreement to form a trust).
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"travel trust fund" for one of the parent's visitation expenses if the parents
live far apart,115 and even to ensure that a portion of a lump sum worker's
compensation award could be set aside for child support where the father
was uncertain to have future income.1 16 In addition, although some states
still prohibit courts from requiring obligors to pay for postsecondary educa-
tion, in recent years courts have been "more willing to enforce agreements
between the parents that benefit the child by requiring support ... for high-
er education when not required by statute."117
1. The Tennessee Model: A Framework
Tennessee statutorily provides for high-income obligors to contribute
to trust funds in addition to base child support.118 Although Tennessee's
threshold for high-income calculations is lower than the one suggested in
this Note, it provides an example of a statute that permits courts to incorpo-
rate an educational trust into the child support decision. The Tennessee
provision states as follows:
When the presumptive child support order exceeds the amount found by
multiplying a net [monthly] income of ten thousand dollars ($ 10,000) by
the percentages set out [in the guidelines] ... a [party] seeking support in
excess of the amount provided by the applicable percentage must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that more than this amount is reason-
ably necessary to provide for the needs of the child.
The court may require that sums paid pursuant to this subparagraph be
placed in an educational or other trust fund for the benefit of the child. 119
In Price v. Price, the court applied this statute to a father whose yearly
income was roughly $230,000.120 The trial court required the father to pay
115. Lasich v. Lasich, No. C040037, 2002 WL 31529039, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2002).
116. See, e.g., Tyc v. Tyc, No. FA 920513300, 1997 WL 804849, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 12,
1997).
117. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Parentage and
Assisted Reproduction Problems Take Center Stage, 39 FAM. L.Q. 879, 900 (2006).
118. See, e.g., Laura W. Morgan, Child Support and the High Income Parent: The Uses and Misus-
es of the Good Fortune Trust, 72 FLA. B.J. 102, 103-04 (1998). Morgan explained that:
[Tennessee's] provision was applied in [a case] ... [where] the father earned approximately
$260,000 per year. The trial court ordered the father to pay $3,092.62 per month in support,
with $1,780.17 reserved for a trust fund established for the child's college education. The
Tennessee Supreme Court held that this was appropriate, because limiting a child to support
that covers everyday expenses may be neither appropriate, nor equitable: such an automatic
limit fails to take into consideration the extremely high standard of living of a parent such as
[the father], and thus fails to reflect one of the primary goals of the guidelines, i.e., to allow
the child of a well-to-do parent to share in that very high standard of living.
Id (quoting Nash v. Mulle, 846 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tenn. 1993)).
119. TENN. CoMP. R. & REGS. 1240-2-4-.07(g)(1), (g)(2)(iii) (2008).
120. No. M1998-00840-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 192569, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2000).
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$2,100 per month in child support and $700 per month into an "educational
trust" for the child.121 The court order also stated that any money that had
not been spent out of the trust by the time the child was twenty-four would
revert to the father.122
In Huntley v. Huntley, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's creation of a different type of trust. 123 There, the total child
support requirement was $6,600 per month, but the trial court required
about $3,100 of it to be paid to the mother for child support and the other
$3,500 to be paid into a non-educational trust for the benefit of the child
that would revert to the father when the child turned twenty-five.124 The
court noted that under Tennessee law the trust can be established for non-
educational purposes and that in this case, the parties already had set aside
enough money for the child's post-secondary educational needs.125
In Lee v. Askew, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision requiring the father, a professional athlete, to pay into a
trust for his child.12 6 There, the court rejected the father's contention that
the statute was infringing on his constitutional right to privacy.127 At least
one commentator has noted that in the case of the professional athlete, the
trust can benefit the father by safeguarding both the father and the child
against the day when the athlete's likely short-lived career ends.128
Tennessee's approach provides a framework for how courts can use a
trust when awarding high-income child support. However, this framework
can be improved upon to address the policy and economic problems inhe-
rent in high-income child support decisions. For instance, in the case of the
high-income parent with a consistent and reliable income, limiting the trust
to purely post-secondary education uses can assuage the fear that the cus-
todial parent will somehow unduly benefit from the additional support.
Also, framing the trust fund such that the child can spend the money
in it however he or she wishes upon reaching a certain age may be inappro-
priate. Giving the child such broad discretion over the trust may undermine
the goal of reducing tension between the family members regarding the
child support arrangement. For instance, if there is no limit on how the
money can be spent, the obligee could perhaps coerce the child to make
121. Id. at *8.
122. Id. at *9.
123. 61 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 338.
126. No. 02A01-9805-JV-00 133, 1999 WL 142389, at *1, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1999).
127. Id. at *3.
128. See, Quinlen, supra note 113, at 121.
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purchases that benefit the obligee and not the child. The parents may also
argue over what the child should or should not be purchasing with this
court-ordered allowance. However, if the obligor has sole discretion over
how the trust can be spent outside of educational purposes, he or she can
rest assured knowing that the money put into the trust will be spent only on
purchases that he or she approves. This approach may help to reduce the
impression that the obligor is being taken advantage of by the legal system
or the obligee.
2. Framework for the Post-Secondary Education Trust
The trust should be straightforward in order to minimize contentious
proceedings, increase courtroom efficiency, and maximize the long-term
welfare of the child-all of which are general goals of the child support
guidelines.129 The following formula aims to meet these goals as well as
the needs of the parents and the children.
The first step is to determine which obligors are high-income earners.
In order for courts to only use the trust option in limited circumstances,
states could use a high threshold yearly income for the obligor to be consi-
dered high-income. This number should fall somewhere in the vicinity of
the top 5% of incomes in the state, as explained above. Thus, for instance,
if the high-income threshold is $300,000 gross income per year, then any
obligor who earns that amount or more is a high-income earner and will be
required to pay into a trust. Likewise, anyone who earns a gross income of
$299,999 per year or less would not be a high-income earner, and would
not be required to pay into the trust.
Admittedly, setting a bright line cutoff for the high-income calculation
could create a perverse incentive for the father to try to earn a slightly low-
er salary, or otherwise decrease his income level, if he or she earns just
above the $299,999 threshold. However, in states that bar dissipation of
marital assets, the father may be deterred from such action, since the court
may consider the father's income prior to such dissipation.130
129. See Morgan, supra note 77 at 168 ("By requiring the states to establish child support guide-
lines, the federal government hoped to accomplish four main goals ... : (1) increase the adequacy of
child support awards; (2) increase the consistency and predictability of child support awards; (3) in-
crease compliance through perceived fairness of child support awards; and (4) increase the ease of
administration of child support cases.").
130. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E.2d 1314, 1319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (explaining that
"[D]issipation refers to the 'use of marital property for the sole benefit of one of the spouses for a
purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time that the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable break-
down."').
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Moreover, although this may appear to be a harsh cutoff, those who
earn over the $299,999 threshold will actually be getting a break compared
to those in the lower salary bracket. The high-income earner will, at most,
be required to pay the amount that he or she would have paid had the
guidelines applied to his or her entire salary. However, in most circums-
tances, the high-income earner will pay less than that, as shown in the ex-
ample and table below.
The second step is to calculate the base child support obligation ac-
cording to guidelines for a large portion of the high-income obligor's sala-
ry. To make the trust workable for those who are very close to the cutoff,
the base child support obligation of a high-income obligor who earns a
gross income of $300,000 per year or more could be based on the first
$275,000 of his or her income.
The third step is for the court to require the obligor to pay into a trust
an amount that would equal the average cost of four years of tuition, fees,
room, and board at a private university in the United States. However, the
obligor must not be required to pay more than the amount he or she would
have been required to pay had the guidelines applied uniformly to his or her
entire income.
The choice of the private university tuition, fees, room, and board as
the amount to be placed into the trust has two bases. First, children of high-
income parents are significantly more likely than any other children to
attend private universities. 131 Second, the total amount that the trust would
hold by the time the child is of college age is currently around $150,000.132
Although this number goes up each year, like the new thresholds, it can be
indexed to the rate of inflation so that there need not be legislative action
every time there is an inflation change.
The total amount paid into the trust then should be significantly less
than a year's salary for the obligor. Using the average cost for a person to
attend a private university in the United States would ensure that the child
would be able to attend such a school if he or she is admitted. At the same
131. See, e.g., SARAH BURD-SHARPS, KRISTEN LEWIS & EDUARDO BORGES MARTINS, THE
MEASURE OF AMERICA: AMERICAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008-2009 113 (Sarah Burd-
Sharps et al. eds., 2008) ("[M]ost elite colleges and universities enroll primarily children of privilege.
Students from advantaged family backgrounds-those whose parents are well educated, have high-
status occupations, and earn high salaries-are twenty-five times more likely to attend a "top-tier"
college than students from disadvantaged backgrounds"); JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN, 536-37
(2005) ("By 2000, the cost of a year at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton had reached the staggering sum of
more than $35,000-an amount that well under 10 percent of American families could afford.. .. Yet at
all three institutions, a majority of students were able to pay their expenses without financial assis-
tance-compelling testimony that ... the Big Three continued to draw most of their students from the
most affluent segments of American society.").
132. See, e.g., Karabel, supra note 131 at 536-37.
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time, it would also provide a cap on the amount of money that a very high-
income obligor would ultimately be required to pay into the trust.
The final step is to calculate the additional child support, and add it on
to the base child support to determine the total child support obligation.
This additional child support would be based upon the obligor's gross year-
ly income over $275,000 minus the yearly trust payment. This is necessary
to add on to the child support obligation to help ensure that the child expe-
rience a minimally similar lifestyle to that of the obligor. However, to cal-
culate this figure, the court can use a lower multiplier than was used for the
base child support amount. That way, the total support obligation can be
less likely to provide the child or the obligee parent with an excessive
amount of money. The following table illustrates this step:133
Number of Children Additional Child Support Calculation
One .088 x (gross annual income above $275,000
per year minus the yearly trust payment)
Two .129 x (gross annual income above $275,000
per year minus the yearly trust payment)
Three .153 x (gross annual income above $275,000
per year minus the yearly trust payment)
Four .169 x (gross annual income above $275,000
per year minus the yearly trust payment)
Five .183 x (gross annual income above $275,000
per year minus the yearly trust payment)
six .196 x (gross annual income above $275,000
per year minus the yearly trust payment)
The following is an example to illustrate how the trust would work.
Jim, the obligor, earns $500,000 per year. Pam, the obligee, has no income.
They have one child, Scott, who is ten years old. Jim and Pam live in Illi-
nois, a percentage-of-income state. The threshold for high-income earners
is set at $300,000, so Jim is a high-income earner. Under this model, Jim is
required to pay 20% of his yearly income up to $275,000 for base child
support. Therefore, Jim's base child support obligation is calculated as
follows: 20% x $275,000 = $55,000. The $55,000 is then divided by 12
months, to arrive at a base support obligation of approximately $4,583 per
month.
133. The calculations used here are adapted from West Virginia's child support award guidelines
for "[c]ombined adjusted gross incomes above fifteen thousand dollars [per month]." W. VA. CODE
§ 48-13-303 (2002).
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The next step is to determine what amount Jim would have paid per
month if the guidelines applied to his entire salary. In this case, he would
have paid 20% of $500,000, or about $8,333 per month. Because Jim can-
not be required to pay more than the difference between the support
amount awarded and the amount that would have been awarded had guide-
lines applied uniformly to his salary, Jim's trust payment cannot exceed
$3,750 per month.
Next, the amount that will go into the trust would be $150,000, assum-
ing that is the average cost of four years of tuition, fees, room, and board at
a private university at the time of the proceeding. If Jim pays $1,563 per
month into the trust, he will have paid the full tuition amount within eight
years. Since the goal is that the total amount will be paid into the trust by
the time the child is college-aged (normally eighteen), the court should
require Jim to pay at least $1,563per month into the trust. Thus, by the time
Scott turns eighteen, the trust will be paid in full. Moreover, if Jim com-
pletes payment into the trust prior to Scott's eighteenth birthday, he will be
done with this portion of his obligation.
Finally, the additional child support obligation will be based upon
Jim's yearly gross income over $275,000 minus his trust obligation. Jim
grosses $500,000 per year. So, Jim's yearly gross income over $275,000 is
$500,000-$275,000, or $225,000. Next, Jim's yearly trust payment ($1,563
x 12 = $18,756) must be subtracted from his yearly gross income over
$275,000: $225,000-$18,756 = $206,244. Since there is only one child, the
court will look to the additional child support chart and simply multiply
$206,244 by .088 to get the yearly additional amount of $18,149. Thus,
Jim's total monthly support obligation is: base support ($4,583) + addition-
al support ($18,149-12 = $1512) = $6,095.
Jim's monthly support payment of $6,095 plus his trust payment of
$1,563 per month saves Jim $675 per monththat he would have paid had
the regular guidelines applied to him. At the same time, the additional sup-
port amount can help Pam to provide Scott with a lifestyle more commen-
surate with Jim's. Moreover, the trust allows Jim to provide Scott with the
educational opportunities that he may have had if Jim and Pam had not
gotten divorced.
If all of the money saved in the trust is not spent on post-secondary
education, it should not revert to the obligor, as the Tennessee cases have
held,134 or revert to the child for whatever purpose the child desires, as
134. See e.g. Huntley v. Huntley, 61 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
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others have suggested.135 Instead, the obligor should simply be the trustee.
That way, the obligor can dictate how the child spends the money. Ideally,
this approach would help cultivate a positive relationship between the obli-
gor and his or her children. However, on a practical level, it may also help
the obligor to feel that he or she still has control over the money to some
degree.
Moreover, the trust need not revert to the child or obligor upon reach-
ing a certain age. Rather, with the obligor as trustee, the trust can last for
much longer. This approach fits with contemporary family structures since
children today remain economically dependent on their parents for much
longer than they have in the past.136 Also, the interest accrued on the trust
as it grows can be paid directly to the father-trustee. This would give the
father an incentive to agree to be the trustee, and would also ensure that the
father's payments would be limited to the actual dollars put in.
From a policy standpoint, such a trust can help to meet one of the oft-
cited aims of child support: to provide the child with the level of support
that he or she would have had if the parents had not divorced.137 Intergene-
rational transfers of wealth, which are generally only possible in higher-
income families, decrease as a result of divorce.138 One study has found
that higher-income divorced parents are more likely than other divorced
parents to provide an intergenerational transfer of wealth to their child-
ren.139 However, where the divorce occurs when the child is between six
and seventeen years old, the father's likelihood of transferring wealth is
very low-just above 5%; the mother's likelihood of making such a trans-
135. See e.g. In re Marriage of Chandler, 60 Cal. App. 4th 124, 132-33, 136 (1997) (Sills, P.J.,
dissenting) (contending that the trial court's decision to require a post-secondary education trust that
reverted back to the child should have been upheld).
136. See ROSAtE G. GENOVESE, AMERICANS AT MIDLIFE: CAUGHT BETWEEN GENERATIONS 32
(1997) ("Young adulthood, roughly defined as the years between 18 and 29 is a time for making deci-
sions about work, family and marriage, for establishing families and households. In the past, graduate
and professional school students were the most likely ones to remain economically dependent, relying
on support from their parents until their late 20s. However, many young people today remain dependent
much longer, particularly because of housing costs and other economic considerations. They also are
postponing marriage. Only 65 percent of those from 25 to 35 years of age had started their own families
in recent years, down from 83 percent in 1960. One interpretation is that the stages of life are being
stretched out as a result of longer life expectancy.").
137. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E.2d 1314, 1326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ("The trial court
must consider the standard of living the child would have enjoyed absent parental separation and disso-
lution."); Smith v. Smith, 67 P.3d 351, 354 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) ("[A]t least some consideration
should be given to the child's actual needs, which may include consideration of the child's lifestyle.").
138. See Furstenberg, Hoffman& Shrestha, supra note 112, at 327.
139. See id. at 326-27 (Time and money transfers are "affected strongly by both the parents' and
the child's incomes. A 10% increase in the parent's income raises the probability of a monetary transfer
by 5.4%.").
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fer is also low-hovering around 28%.140 The latter circumstance is the
exact situation that the trust discussed here should be in place for: families
who divorce when the children are minors. 141
In fact, just because high-income divorced fathers pay child support
does not mean that they will, therefore, provide for their children post-
majority in the manner that they would have had they remained married.
The aforementioned study explained that there was "absolutely no evidence
that fathers who paid child support are more likely to be involved in subse-
quent transfers [of wealth] with their adult children. Indeed four of the
estimates . . . are negative and statistically significant." 14 2 Therefore, a trust
fund with the obligor as the trustee can help ensure that the child will be
more likely to be in the financial position that he or she would have been in
had his or her parents remained married.
Furthermore, "numerous studies show that 'children of divorced par-
ents are less likely to equal or surpass their parents' social and economic
status."'1 43 Therefore, the trust may also act as a much-needed stepping
stone to help the children reach levels of success similar to their high-
income parent.
C. Joint Physical Custody
Joint physical custody involves the child living with both parents, ra-
ther than simply visiting with one on the weekends. Such an arrangement
"refers to the sharing of residential care of the child or, in other words,
regularly switching with whom the child lives."l44 With joint physical cus-
tody, "both parents share physical and custodial care of the child."l 45
When the parents share physical custody of the children, courts often
award less support to the obligee depending upon what percent of time she
has the children in her home. However, as explained below, the child sup-
port award should not be decreased as a result of joint physical custody.
140. See id. at 328 ("The differences in transfers between mothers and fathers reflect primarily the
effect of age at divorce on transfers with mothers, where all of the effects shown are statistically signifi-
cant.").
141. In fact, "the majority of children whose parents divorced were six years of age or younger
when their parents separated." Maldonado, supra note 73, at 454.
142. See Furstenberg, Hoffman, & Shrestha, supra note 113 at 330.
143. Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227,
2258 (1994).
144. Eliza B. Hutchison, Improving Custody Law in Virginia Without Creating a Rebuttable Pre-
sumption of Joint Custody, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 523, 526 (1998) (internal quotations omit-
ted).
145. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Rather, the same rules should apply because of the compelling need to
balance the standard of living in the two households.
1. Disparate Parental Resources
In the case examples provided in Part II, the obligees, typically the
mothers, had significantly lower incomes than the obligors. In most of
those cases, the mothers had no income at all. This situation is often the
result of "specialization" that occurs during the marriage.146 Historically, it
has been considered beneficial for families to have a mother who specializ-
es in the home and a father who specialize in the labor force.147
For high-income families, this situation does not generally become
economically problematic until divorce. Upon divorce, however, the parent
that specialized in the labor force likely has a solid career and has been able
to steadily increase his or her salary. On the other hand, the parent that has
specialized in the home is left with a markedly inferior ability to find em-
ployment, let alone to demand an equivalent salary. 148
Specializing in the home has in the past been the province of wom-
en. 149 In part as a result of this apparent specialization, they generally have
received primary custody of the children upon divorce.15 0 In such a custody
situation, the children live with the mother and have a set amount of time
during which they visit with the father. 151 Yet, recently, "[c]ases in which
the child spends significant amounts of time with both parents seem to
constitute a small, but important, segment of custody arrangements."1 52
Although joint physical custody may solve the problem of fathers not
receiving sufficient time with their children to form a relationship with
them, it is by no means a panacea for the inequitable child support prob-
lems that result. For instance, one study found that "the greater affluence
[of shared custody fathers] . . . was evident" in examining the disparity in
living arrangements between the fathers and mothers in joint physical cus-
tody situations: seventy-three percent of fathers owned their home, while
only fifty-nine percent of mothers did.153 Although this statistic does not
146. See Hardy, supra note 71, at 333.
147. Id.
148. Id
149. See Hutchison, supra note 144, at 527.
150. See id at 528.
151. See id at 523-24.
152. See Marygold S. Melli & Patricia R. Brown, The Economics of Shared Custody: Developing
an Equitable Formula for Dual Residence, 31 HoUs. L. REv. 543, 549 (1994)
153. Marygold S. Melli &Patricia R. Brown, Exploring a New Family Form-The Shared Time
Family, 22 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 231, 241 (2008).
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speak to the quality of the household and the reasons for this disparity, it is
illustrative of the idea that the child may be living highly dissimilar life-
styles in his or her two homes.
In addition, in examining joint physical custody cases where no child
support was awarded, the same study found that, while in forty-three per-
cent of cases the amount of money that would have been payable would
have been less than fifty dollars per month, the remaining fifty-seven per-
cent of cases that awarded no support would have awarded more than fifty
dollars per month.154 Such findings indicate that the obligees may also be
more likely to receive inadequate support awards when they share physical
custody with the obligors.
2. Fixed Costs
"The son of a king has the needs of a prince. The son of a chimney
sweep must settle for the needs of a pauper. A child shouldn't have to
change from a prince to a pauper every time he returns to his mother's
home." 55 This quote, in somewhat exaggerated terms, outlines the unique
problem that results when one of the parents is a high-income earner, while
the other earns considerably less.
When compiling econometric data for child support awards, legisla-
tures often fail to distinguish between the immediate child care costs that
are "paid by the parent currently caring for the child," and the fixed ex-
penses a parent incurs in having and raising children.156 Immediate ex-
penses include items like food and clothing. 157 On the other hand, fixed
expenses include those related to housing and transportation: mortgage or
rent payments, utility costs, property taxes, 158 and "owning and maintain-
ing a vehicle." 59
A parent must pay the fixed expenses regardless of how much time is
spent in actual custody of the children. Therefore, whether the obligee has
the children for ninety percent of the time, or thirty percent of the time, she
must still maintain the house that her children reside in when they are with
her. This cost, however, is unaccounted for in many child support decisions
and guidelines.
154. See id. at 247.
155. Ronald F. Logar, Wealth, A Substitute for Need: A Critical Look at Gabler-Herz, 57-APR
INTER ALIA 8, 10 (1992).
156. See Sanford L. Braver, The Gender Gap in Standard of Living After Divorce: Vanishingly
Small?, 33 FAM. L.Q. 111, 127 (1999).
157. See id.
158. See, Colonna v. Colonna, 855 A.2d 648, 649 n.1 (Pa. 2004).
159. Melli & Brown, supra note 152 at 559.
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Thus, in high-income joint physical custody cases, the children may
travel back and forth between highly dissimilar home environments. At
least one court has permitted deviation above guidelines in order to remedy
the disparate living situations between parents who share physical custody
of the children. 160 In that case, the goal was not to make the living ar-
rangements between the parents exactly equal.161 Instead, the goal is gener-
ally to create a better balance between the two households. This attempt by
courts to even the playing field can result in a complex and unclear balanc-
ing of parties' interests and needs. However, the ultimate goal is appropri-
ate in light of the negative effects that an imbalanced living arrangement
can have upon the children.
3. The Same Guidelines Should Apply
As explained above, joint physical custody worsens the problem of
disparate living arrangements inherent in many high-income divorces.
First, joint physical custody tends to play out much better on paper than in
reality. For instance, one may reasonably assume that because a father has
received joint physical custody, he will spend more time with his children
than he would have if the mother had retained sole physical custody. How-
ever, fathers do not necessarily share physical custody even when permitted
to do so by the court. In fact, the American Law Institute has noted that
"[t]here is frequently little relationship between the de jure award of resi-
dential responsibility and de facto residence." 62
The fact that fathers will not necessarily help more in the caretaking of
the children heightens the disparate circumstances of the parents. Because
"[m]ost states allow an adjustment or deviation from the guidelines for
greater time spent with the children,"163 the father may be able to reduce
his total child support obligation. The mother, on the other hand, in many
cases the former homemaker, now must juggle establishing her career
(which will likely be much lower-paying than the father's) and caring for
her children, with even less money than she otherwise would have had.
160. See Colonna, 855 A.2d at 651-52.
161. See id.at 652 ("We specifically note that the term 'appropriate' does not mean equal to the
environment the children enjoy while in the custodial parent's care, nor does it mean 'merely adequate.'
The determination of appropriateness is left to the discretion of the trial court, upon consideration of all
relevant circumstances.").
162. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Diference in the Law: Revaluing
the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 54 n. 265 (2008) (quoting PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 3.03 cmt. f).
163. Stephen K. Erickson, If They Can Do Parenting Plans, They Can Do Child Support Plans, 33
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 827, 844 (2007).
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Thus, there is a genuine concern that a father may request joint physical
custody to reduce his child support obligation.164
Moreover, when the child lives in two different homes, there is a
greater policy reason to equalize the households of the two parents. A child
experiencing two very different lifestyles-one very wealthy, and one
within the middle class-may feel internally conflicted over this flux in his
life. In fact, such a problem is particularly apparent where one parent has a
much higher income than the other because the child is then "regularly re-
exposed to the gap between his or her current living standard and that of
the noncustodial parent he or she visits." 165
The child may also feel a desire to live only with the high-income par-
ent if the parents' households are greatly disparate. The child's feeling of
being torn between two imbalanced lives could potentially cause increased
discord within the family. As one commentator has noted:
The interests of the children will not be served if the amount of child
support is barely enough to meet their basic needs in the lower income
home, while they enjoy a luxurious lifestyle in the other home. Further-
more, the less affluent parent may feel obliged to provide a similar envi-
ronment to that of the more affluent parent or run the risk that the child
will prefer to make the more affluent home his or her primary resi-
dence. 166
Moreover, one of the most significant negative effects of divorce on
children is the general instability that results. 167 The concern over instabili-
ty usually focuses on children whose custodial parent or parents must move
as a result of the divorce-causing loss of schools, peers, and familiar sur-
roundings.168 In the joint physical custody context, the fact that the child
must regularly move from home to home inherently engenders some insta-
bility. However, providing the child with the opportunity to live with both
parents is generally viewed as beneficial enough to outweigh this negative
factor.169 Nonetheless, the inherent instability in this living arrangement
164. See, e.g., Melli & Brown, supra note 153, at 234("Women's advocates have opposed these
initiatives [by father's rights groups to have custody statutes that do not allot equal joint custody to be
held unconstitutional], fearing that the fathers' interest is in reduced child support not child care and
that a presumption of shared custody ignores the real danger of domestic violence." (footnote omitted)).
165. See Ellman & Ellman, supra note 13, at 143.
166. Julien D. Payne, A Practitioner's Guide to the Economic Implications of Custody and Access
under the Divorce Act and the Federal Child Support Guidelines, 32 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 1, 13
(2002) (Can.).
167. Kathryn E. Maxwell, Preventive Lawyerin& Strategies to Mitigate the Detrimental Effects of
Clients 'Divorces on their Children, 67 REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD P.R. 137, 140 (1998).
168. See id. at 140-41.
169. See, e.g., Michael T. Flannery, Is "Bird Nesting" in the Best Interest of Children?, 57 SMU L.
REV. 295, 324 (2004) ( "[W]ith respect to the instability of relocating from a primary residence to a
secondary residence, although there are clearly aspects of such an arrangement that negatively affect the
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may be aggravated by requiring the child to change his or her lifestyle
every time he or she is shuttled to the other parent's home.
Thus, joint physical custody, as a circumstance that arises more fre-
quently with high-income divorces, presents a compelling need that is not
quite as salient in sole custody cases: the need for equalization of the living
arrangements in the households. This inequality is emphasized when courts
determine the amount of support based upon the amount of time each par-
ent has the children. However, the level of support the obligee receives as a
result of agreeing to joint physical custody should not be decreased. Nar-
rowly focusing only on the percent of time a parent has a child in his or her
household does not produce equitable results. There will always be fixed
costs that cannot be reduced proportionately to the percent of time spent
with the child. Thus, the parents' fixed costs and the child's need for stabil-
ity must be accounted for in order to garner an equitable child support
award.
Therefore, the solution proposed in this Note should apply to joint
physical custody arrangements just as it would apply to sole custody ar-
rangements. Likely, there may be some hesitation on this point over con-
cerns that the additional money the obligee's family might gain by
following the guidelines proposed in this Note would be a subsidy for the
obligee's excesses. However, this concern is likely a red herring since the
high-income obligor will still pay significantly less than if the regular
guidelines applied to his salary. Moreover, insofar as the concern may be
credible, it is substantially outweighed by the need to lessen the lifestyle
and income gap in the child's two households.
CONCLUSION
One of the main purposes of the 1988 Family Support Act was to en-
sure that there would be a presumption that following the guidelines would
produce an adequate support award.170 The first part of the solution pro-
posed in this Note upholds this purpose by eliminating the troublesome
discretionary path high-income child support has taken. If state legislatures
increase the threshold for a father to be classified as a high-income earner,
they can increase courts' use of guidelines in child support cases. This in-
creased use of the guidelines could increase predictability for the parties,
which would create a disincentive for the parents to litigate the child sup-
child, children experiencing these arrangements are overall quite resilient and are not as negatively
affected long-term as might otherwise be supposed.").
170. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.§ 667(b)(2) (2006)).
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port issue. If the parties know what they are entitled to receive or are re-
quired to pay, then there would be little need for them to litigate this issue.
Furthermore, increased settlement of cases can help to alleviate both the
financial costs and the emotional problems associated with protracted child
support litigation.
Likewise, the second part of the solution proposed in this Note also
stays true to one of the purposes of child support: providing the child with
the lifestyle he or she would have had if the marriage had remained intact.
If courts require high-income fathers to contribute to a post-secondary edu-
cation trust as a part of their child support obligation, then this added sup-
port can provide the child with the educational opportunities he or she
would have had if the divorce had not occurred. Since children of divorced
parents have a decreased likelihood of achieving the same economic suc-
cess as their parents, they may benefit greatly from the incentive this trust
would give them to complete a post-secondary education. Thus, this part of
the solution serves to shelter the children from the social and economic
harms of their parents' divorce by increasing the odds that more high-
income obligors will suitably provide for their children.
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